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5  Untying the Climate-Development Gordian Knot: Economic Options in a 
Politically Constrained World 
Jean-Charles Hourcade, P. R. Shukla, and Sandrine Mathy 
 
Climate policies must deal with a contradiction generic to global environment 
policies: as was recognized as early as in 1972 at the UN conference on Human 
Environment at Stockholm, the participation of developing countries is essential. 
The current emissions of developing countries are also significant. If the trend 
continues, the future share of global emissions from developing countries will be 
even larger. However, developing countries do not yet see the need to cooperate 
because they perceive environmental issues to be a form of Malthusianism. Thus, 
despite repeated calls for sustainable development at Rio (1992), the negotiations for 
framing a climate regime have remained disengaged from the debates on how to 
embark on sound development paths, thus tying a Gordian knot through a 
succession of misunderstandings. 
This unhappy turn in policy talks is all the more grave as the timing of the 
climate change issue is inopportune for developing countries. The increasing attention 
to the climate change phenomenon has coincided with a period in which many 
developing countries are experiencing rapid economic growth and in which global 
power equations are changing (military power, globalization of world markets, and 
control over natural resources). No sword of a present-day Alexander can cut this 
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knot tied by history. The aim of this chapter is to pick out the threads that, when 
pulled, may untie the knot.  
 
 
5.1 Intellectual Sources of North–South Misunderstandings, 1988 to 2005 
 
It is apt to recall the G7’s  paradoxical haste, three years after the first predictions of 
global warming by three-dimensional climate models, to bring to the diplomatic 
agenda an affair for which its members had born a huge historical responsibility. This 
attempt cannot be explained without regarding a broad geopolitical reshaping of the 
petroleum game by the emergence of a large block of developing countries as major 
consumers in the twenty-first century (Schlessinger 1989).  
The momentum to initiate a cap and trade architecture did not come from 
the deployment of an ex ante full-fledged vision; it was rather the outcome of a 
succession of diplomatic faits accomplis (Bodanski 2001), the most important being 
the adoption at Berlin (1994) of a quantity-based approach to create an incentive 
system that would embrace all countries and sectors. The decision rested on the 
economic notion that a single price of carbon worldwide is essential to minimize the 
costs of meeting a global target and to prevent distortion in international 
competition. After 1992 the unpopularity of carbon taxes left the cap and trade 
system the sole contender for this purpose. Against the reluctance of some quarters 
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in the European Union  that wanted caps with limits to trade, this system was 
advocated as best meeting the criteria of cost-effectiveness, environmental integrity, 
universal participation, and flexibility vis-à-vis national sovereignty.  
On the North–South question, the cap and trade system, as argued by Grubb 
regarding negotiating targets (1989), had the advantage of organizing large enough 
North–South transfers to induce a significant commitment by the South in the short 
term. The commitment of the South would not adequately materialize, however, as 
the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (article 3.1 of the 
UNFCCC) led to the cautious decision that only developed countries would adopt 
binding commitments in the first period. But the silence on targets for the 
developing countries beyond 2012 had the perverse effect of treating them as pure 
spectators of the intra–annex-B debates (target setting and a supplementarity 
squabble) as if the South should be content with their absence of commitment, or 
avoidance of damages, thanks to the Kyoto Protocol, and obtain some financial and 
technological gains through jointly implemented abatement projects. The silence 
about the developing countries’ future commitments and the disengagement of 
climate negotiations from other global governance issues (energy, trade, and 
technology) brought skepticism if not distrust. 
As became duly clear from subsequent events, the cap and trade option could 
not be a magic bullet for either side: 
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• The US Senate (Byrd-Hagel resolution 1997) demanded developing 
countries to agree to “new specific scheduled commitments to limit 
or reduce greenhouse gas emissions.”  The large asymmetry of 
carbon constraints for developing economies was rejected by the no 
vote without participation principle (Bodansky 2001).  
• On the final day of COP3, the G77 plus China concurred that until 
the question of emission rights and entitlements is not addressed 
equitably it will not be possible to have emissions trading (G7 and 
China 1997). The concern was unfair future quota allocations but 
also the will of emerging economies to be politically engaged in 
the debate. 
Why the diplomatic momentum was not altered as a result is a complex story. 
It may be due to the prevalence of misinterpreted economic communications. 
Between COP3 and COP6, supporters of the Kyoto Protocol could not surmount 
the political divergences over the technical modalities of cap and trade enforcement 
and make credible offers to developing countries.  
 
5.2 The Tabula Rasa Myth 
The science of economics has evolved through uneasy journeys, among them routes 
of neglect, distrust, misuse, and abuse, the same as in any other science. Contributing 
to the present confusion is that optimal tools in a first-best world can be far from 
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optimal if applied without caution in a second-best world. In the real world there are 
no tabulae rasae; countries are full of imperfections, the hallmarks of which in 
conditions of underdevelopment are the existence of incomplete and fragmented 
markets (multiple discount rates, unequal marginal costs across sectors and regions), 
weak policy regimes, poor governance, under protected property rights (land, 
technology, and IPRs), and dual economies in perpetual reformation. Carbon pricing 
for the so-called second-best world has two main consequences. 
First, the carbon price signal in countries experiencing multiple rapid 
transitions and technological shifts is swamped by noise from other signals. One 
possible perverse effect is that the carbon price will increase carbon emissions as 
the switch is made to carbon-intensive nontraded energy resources (Sagar 2005) 
and will initially also reduce the electricity access of the rural sector. This is not 
just a matter of a relative price to service ratio. Rural markets have informal 
lending mechanisms that provide credit to small enterprises and households with 
high interest rates in a context of low labor rates due to the lack of firm wage 
contracts. The benefits associated with energy resources from a formal market 
therefore do not exist. While benefits could be introduced by altering baseline 
parameters such as interest rates and wages, these mechanisms are beyond the scope 
of climate centric policy. 
Second, the development benefits of carbon trading are uncertain; this is not 
only because annex-B countries will not accept allocation rules generating large 
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external transfers; they recognize that the revenues from carbon exports may not 
materialize as higher income for the exporter. Indeed, to exploit the full potential of 
carbon export for a given world carbon price, the domestic energy price has to 
increase more, in relative value, in most developing countries than in the European 
Union and in the United States (four and two times more respectively in India); the 
negative income effect would be such that it may not be fully compensated by the 
inflow of carbon revenues especially in countries with market distortions, large 
inequalities, and political constraints to redistribution (Ghersi et al. 2003). To avoid 
the dampening of growth, governments would then export only that fraction of the 
export potential for which these adverse effects can be compensated by an efficient 
recycling of carbon revenues. So the availability of cheap carbon in developing 
countries may be significantly lower than suggested by partial equilibrium analysis. 
This lack of trust in carbon credits could be amended by short-term benefits 
from the CDM. Unlike the Kyoto joint implementation program, it would mean a 
sudden change in operation with an inversion of priorities that  would more credibly 
place sustainable development in the first rank and the facilitation of annex-B 
commitments in the third. But despite a recent rise in the number of projects, 
participation has been limited because of contradictory requirements: 
environmentalists seeking an environmental outcome additional to the baseline and 
funding agencies’ reluctance to provide additional support from the fear of diversion 
of overseas development assistance funds for the environment. As a result both 
  
126
 
parties have put off funding (which remains to be tapped) and have excluded 
infrastructure projects from the CDM because the “avoided” emissions are difficult to 
ascertain. 
Barring the pursuit of a Brazilian type of compliance fund or an extension of 
the share of proceeds on mechanisms that could provide funding complementary to 
carbon revenues, the developing countries have chosen to interpret the offer of 
annex-B countries as an empty pledge that would result in  pawning the real present 
welfare for the unreal future gains. 
 
 
5.2.1 Burden Sharing and Normative Equity Principles 
The equity issues relating to the climate debate were obvious from the outset. So it is 
remarkable that economists remain silent about the theoretical framing of fairness on 
emission rights and have restricted themselves to studying the outcomes of competing 
ethical intuitions. 
The most challenging of these intuitions is the equal per capita distribution of 
emissions rights (Agarwal and Narain 1991). Arguably, such an allocation may be 
inequitable. Individuals live in very different ambient climates, with different spatial 
constraints and energy accesses (Godard 2000; Neumayer 2002), but the rhetorical 
proximity between the notions of equity and equality has transformed this principle 
into a political icon for those who consider the grandfathering principle an 
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environmental colonialism. This icon was strong enough to be retained at Marrakech 
in 2001. 
There could not arise anything but intense debate. Grandfathering is widely 
considered to underlie the international agreements on, for example, multilateral 
fishing quotas (Sterner 2002), milk quotas in Europe (Burton 1985),  and the SO2 
regime in the United States (Joskow et al. 1999). The real basis is the ethical legitimacy 
of any new environmental regulation as a renegotiation of a social contract, and it is all 
the more fair to account for interests vested under the existing contract as previous 
generations were not informed of the consequences of their behaviors (Claussen et al. 
1998). But distributing rights for the future use of the atmosphere based on 
grandfathering would lead to inequitable future contracts that the developing 
countries cannot accept. 
The search for a consensus on such explicit principles has turned into harsh 
polemics, the two pragmatic positions being (1) starting the rules from grandfathering 
and supporting a contraction and convergence process (Meyer, 2000; Ghersi et al. 
2003) toward equal per capita emissions in the long run or (2) creating rules that refer 
(at least indirectly) to the ability to pay in combination with other criteria (Jacoby et. 
al. 1999). Also explored have been a triptych approach (Phylipsen et al. 1998; 
Groenenberg et al. 2000; Jansen et al. 2001) and proposals from Norway (1996), 
Australia (1997), and Iceland (1997) at the Ad hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate. 
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Given the conflicts of interests, no rule can ensure consensus. The uncertainty 
about the links between the levels of the emissions caps and the carbon prices, and 
their macroeconomic consequences, is sure to generate fuzzy contracts. The 
insinuation is that countries will have to accept one of these positions despite their 
divergent views. In a systematic review Lecocq and Crassous (2003) show country 
preferences related to allocation rules are very unstable and conditional on baselines 
assumptions and time horizons. Both China and Europe, starting from different 
emission levels,could reject rules with high weights to convergence toward 2030 but 
accept the rules if the weights are for only the immediate post-2012 period. It could 
be argued that setting targets for every five years creates a learning curve, but that 
addresses the issue only marginally. The possibility of drastic revisions to the 
allocation rules is rather limited by the political costs of reversing any diplomatic fait 
accompli and by the risk of undermining the dynamic efficiency of the system, since 
countries may then lower their abatement efforts in order to renegotiate lax targets for 
future periods (Helioui 2002).  
Added to these difficulties are two political obstacles. First, governments face 
the task of trade-offs among various assessments criteria: maximizing the funds inflow 
from carbon trading and minimizing the costs for the low-income classes may indeed 
not lead to the same vision of the burden. Second, contradictions arise in cross-
country comparisons: poor citizens of a rich country contribute far less to global 
warming than do rich citizens of developing countries. 
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In fact the big problem is an impasse on what constitutes a fair burden, as 
would include forms of trade-offs within a wide development agenda. Political 
acumen would have made this obvious but for the vulgate of Kantian ethics used in 
international meetings that have overshadowed the Machiavelli’s idea that states are 
cold-hearted monsters designed to defend the selfish interests of their constituents. 
The only way out is to return to Pareto-improving policies; moving afar from the 
focus on “burden sharing” and “property rights entitlement.” Emissions quotas are 
then no longer rights but transitory allowances, and the relevant question is under 
what conditions cap and trade can be used as a tool for removing barriers to 
development. This re-framing does not eliminate debates about equity and 
responsibility; it puts them in the perspective of reshaping development instead of 
capping it. The challenge is to demonstrate that postulating the existence of win-win 
options is not another wishful way to reconcile contradictory interests. 
 
5.2.2 Aligning Development Pathways and Long-term Climate Change 
Policies 
 
An Intellectual Discipline:  Starting from the Suboptimal and Real Baselines 
The common practice of projecting secular growth baselines (often optimistic for 
reasons of political correctness) has hampered the detection of synergies between 
climate and development despite attempts through environment policies to alter this 
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trend. It therefore is appropriate to start by delineating the baselines that incorporate 
barriers to the realization of a growth potential. This was the intellectual tenor at 
Stockholm (1972) where concern over disruptions of local environments opened 
discussion 1 on the perverse effects of ongoing growth patterns (damage due to 
choice of equipment, structural unemployment, disregard of basic population needs, 
erosion of soil). 
The concern voiced at Stockholm 1972 needs to be revisited today in terms 
of the evolving linkages between capital scarcity, infrastructure requirements, and 
social dualism. Cumulative energy investments between 2001 and 2030 are projected 
to reach 2.2 T$ in China, 2.1 T$ in the rest of Asia, and 1.3 T$ in Latin America 
(IEA 2003). Fay and Yepes (2003) estimate that from 2005 to 2010, 6.7 percent of 
the GDP in Asia and 5.5 percent in Africa will have to be invested in energy, 
transportation, water distribution, and sanitation infrastructures. Since 40 to 60 
percent of savings will still have to be invested in buildings, funding infrastructure 
investments will remain critical for reason either of capital scarcity (Africa’s saving 
rate is 8 percent of GDP) or of inefficient allocation in countries with high savings. 
The latter may in addition not sustain a capital-intensive growth when their savings 
rates decline such as in China where the inversion of age pyramid between 2020 and 
2030 is expected to cause a decline of savings from the present 40 to 8 percent in 
2050 (INGENUE 2005). An analogy may be the debt trap of Brazil in the late 1970s 
when 30 percent of the debt was from investments in the energy sector. Low savings 
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can curtail infrastructure programs and enhance resource conflicts between 
populations with very different accesses to energy, water, and transportation. 
Managing energy demand has in fact become more critical as energy security 
is being more and more perceived as a prime development objective by nations 
competing for resources in an era of sustained volatility of energy prices. Recent 
trends only confirm the warnings of the World Energy Conference (WEC) in 1979, 
that the emergence of developing countries as major oil and gas consumers will be a 
source of major world tensions after 2000. Ten years later, in 1989, the WEC was 
reminded of this prognosis in Montréal by James Schlessinger. Added to the 
controversies over the timing of peak oil production, the conventional oil reserves 
have remained increasingly concentrated in politically sensitive regions. 
The question for a climate regime set on tackling energy-related obstacles is 
to what extent the value of carbon can help developing countries move upward on 
the production frontier. In principle, the creation and sharing of a carbon benefit can 
produce a leverage effect by enhancing the profitability of foreign investments, on the 
one hand, and by compensating the transaction costs of Pareto-improving domestic 
policies, on the other. As we explain next, the mechanism to activate win-win options 
is not so remote; it indeed exists.  
 
Development and Climate Synergies: Illustrations from India 
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The counterargument to the notion of no-regret policies that enhance both 
environment quality and economic income is that where a no-regret potential exists, it 
will be tapped anyway. The different examples of this section provide a perspective 
that is not restricted to the instruments and technologies of the 1990s (Jaffe and 
Stavins 1994; IPCC 1995); they show that climate policies can facilitate an upward 
shift in the development baselines with the new baselines presenting even more 
potential for decarbonization policies. 
 
5.2.3 Conjoint Market for Local and Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
Local air pollution reaches highest levels in large developing countries as they 
undergo transitition to urbanization and industrialization. The local air pollutants and 
greenhouse gasses, which are often emitted conjointly, accumulate and create climate 
changes but also health problems for humans affecting their  health and 
development. In India, for instance, 70 percent of coal consumption is by the 
electricity sector (CMIE 2003) with the emissions being mostly sulfur dioxide (SO2). 
In fact, as of 2000, two-thirds of India’s CO2 and SO2  emissions come from 500 
large point sources, of which 82 are coal-based power plants and the rest mostly 
transport, steel, and cement manufacturing (Shukla et al. 2004). 
Yet, although the electricity sector in India lacks efficient emissions controls, 
opportunities exist for creating conjoint emissions control mechanisms. Interestingly 
the relationship between sulfur and carbon control is asymmetric (Pandey and Shukla 
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2002; Garg et al. 2003). Cost-effective measures like better combustion efficiency 
and a fuel switch from coal to gas could reduce sulfur emissions to greater extent 
than carbon emissions, but the cost-effective sulfur control measures like the use of 
clean coal technologies or low-sulfur diesel fuel would have little impact on carbon 
emissions.  The local pollution did draw the attention of national policy makers. 
However, the sequencing of SO2 and CO2 markets proved to be suboptimal because 
the single measures to control local pollution failed to net the co-benefits of 
concurrent SO2 and CO2 mitigation. There is nevertheless scope for a policy 
designed to align both markets and optimize co-benefits. At a low carbon price of 
$20/tCO2, the aggregate mitigation cost over the next 25 years in the conjoint system 
would be lower by $400 million compared to under the two separately operating 
markets. Further the conjoint system could deliver 520 Mt of additional CO2 
mitigation and thereby add $2.6 billion to the carbon benefits (Menon-Choudhary et 
al. 2004). Correcting such asymmetry and incongruent actions typically demands 
institutional financial arrangements at the national level that should benefit from a 
climate regime. 
 
5.2.4 Synergy of Electricity Market Reforms and Revenues from Carbon 
Trading  
After India’s electricity sector reforms in early 1990s the sector became more 
dependent on domestic coal, as hydropower was confronted by high capital costs 
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and the building of large dams besieged by protest movements and interstate water 
disputes. The barriers to hydro and the bottlenecks in coal supplies caused the 
electricity sector to shift to gas in a market where the combined cycle gas technology 
offered advantages of low investment, short gestation, and low local emissions. 
Despite this shift, the carbon content of electricity increased, and the hydro share of 
the market continued a secular decline (Shukla et al. 2004). 
Globally energy reforms also remain centered on fossil fuel. However, in 
2002 came the India Vision 2020 (Planning Commission 2002) plan, which proposed 
an alternative best-case scenario (BCS) that could bifurcate the sector’s development. 
The Vision is directed toward an alternative pathway that includes modernizing 
existing plants, early adoption of advanced technologies, improved T&D efficiency, 
energy conservation, regional energy cooperation, and higher shares of hydro and 
renewable energy. Carbon emissions in 2020, under BCS, are projected to be 81 MtC 
below the BAU (822 MtC cumulated up to 2020). 
In the case of India there could be envisaged a sector-based agreement by 
which the carbon abatements could be sold on the world carbon market.2 The 
implementation of BCS policies (including carbon taxation and subsidies to renewable 
technologies) would have three conjoint effects: (1) lower profitability of coal plants 
and increased profitability of gas and renewable energy, (2) an inflow of foreign capital 
due to the relative profitability of investment in the sector and the lifting of barriers to 
foreign investors, which would replace part of the Indian investment in the power sector 
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in the reference scenario, and (3) the ensuing domestic investment redirected toward 
other sectors. By this mechanism the carbon revenues would have a leverage effect 
whose main determinants would be (with a given value of carbon and regardless of the 
lower public expenditures to compensate local externalities): 
• The gap between the social marginal profitability of energy investment 
with or without BCS policies (including the taxation on coal). 
• The gap between the social marginal profitability of energy and nonenergy 
investment. 
• The share of foreign investments as a function of a foreign investor's 
internal return rate. 
 
With a value of 10$/tC and a linear increasing tax level reaching 30 percent of the coal 
price in 2035, the mechanism would generate an additional income of  US$1.6 to 
US$7 for each dollar of carbon credit depending on assumptions of marginal 
productivity in the power sector and in the rest of the economy (see Mathy et al. 
2001).  
 
Climate Regime and the Co-benefits from Regional Cooperation  Regional 
cooperation, as promoted by the principle 9 of the Rio Declaration on the 
Environment, may be supported by compelling arguments. However, countries are 
so diverse in terms of institutional capacities and political structure that deploying 
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complementarities can become a very complicated business. In the South Asia 
region,3 for example (Nair et al. 2003; Heller and Shukla 2004), there are diverse 
endowments in energy resources—with coal in India, gas in Bangladesh, hydro 
potential in the Himalayan nations of Bhutan and Nepal, and strategic location of 
Pakistan for the transit routes linking South Asia with the vast gas and oil resources 
of Central Asia and the Middle East. Still there is little energy and electricity trade 
in the region. 
 Assuming a regional cooperation, Heller and Shukla (2004) show that the energy 
trade would yield direct economic benefits due to energy savings from improved fuel 
and technology choices and would lower investments in energy supply. The benefits 
are valued at US$319 billion from 2010 to 2030. The economic growth of the region 
would increase by 1 percent each year, benefiting an overwhelming number of the 
world’s poor. Such cooperation would in addition deliver a cumulative carbon saving 
of 1.4 GT for the period 2010 to 2030, or 70 percent of the global mitigation by the 
1997 Kyoto Protocol standard over the estimated baseline emissions (Chandler et al. 
2002), including the original commitment by United States at Kyoto. The energy 
changes would also reduce loads of SO2 in the region by nearly 30 percent. In addition 
the balanced hydro development would yield spillover benefits that are synergistic with 
adaptation needs, among which are enhanced water supply and flood control. 
 
Infrastructure, Development and Climate Vulnerability  Infrastructures designed to 
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withstand and long endure the variabilities of current climate conditions can render them 
vulnerable to climate change. A good example of such long-lived assets is the recently 
constructed Konkan railway. Located on the coastal strip of land bounded by the 
Sahayadri hills and Arabian Sea on the western coast of India, the Konkan railway covers a 
distance of 760 km. It costed US$745 million to build and commenced operations in 1998. 
The railway passes through a mountainous region and has 179 major bridges, 1819 minor 
bridges, and 9 tunnels exceeding 2.2 km (KRCL 1999). Climate projections for the area 
(Mitra et al. 2002) show an increase in the mean and variability of the distribution of the 
key climate parameter of rainfall, the impact assessed in days with more than 200 mm of 
precipitation. Besides rainfall, the development pattern was considered as affecting the 
geology, soil structure, and vegetation cover in the region and also landslides. 
  In the monsoon season the train schedules are disrupted by  waterlogged 
tracks and landslides; 140 such incidences were reported in 2000 (Kapshe et al. 2003). 
The railway company spends 6 percent  of its revenue on repair and maintenance, and 
20 percent of this expenditure is for minimizing the severity of such climate-related 
incidents. Future disruptions are expected to be greater because of the compounded 
effect of climate change and an aging railway infrastructure. It would be prudent to 
protect the infrastructure but adaptation measures like improving climate predictions, 
reinforcing the vulnerable points, and making maintenance regimes more frequent 
require committing more public expenditure, which cannot be fully recovered by taxes 
in India. This case is representative of many such cases in the developing world that 
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call for a climate regime that can deliver cumulative assistance in the form of 
development, mitigation, and adaptation co-benefits. 
 
 
5.3 The Kyoto Architecture Reinterpreted, Amended, Completed 
 
The complexity of climate and development nexus may be an argument for what 
Jacoby metaphorically calls a favela regime (Jacoby 2005), namely a self-organizing 
process instead of a hopeless pursuit of some grand architecture (Bodanski 2003). But 
favelas turned more often into self-reproducing pockets of violence, slavery, and 
poverty than into an innovative urban scheme. The transition to a common 
architecture may fare better if it is instead modest and flexible. 
The main purpose for a common architecture is that the key sectors for the 
climate control are capital intensive with investments spanning over decades. Early 
and credible signals launched in this direction should therefore avoid lock-ins to 
carbon-intensive systems. This does not mean a full-fledged architecture by 2012 but 
the initiation of a process that can gain momentum and converge on some viable 
system. The flaws of Kyoto have been extensively pointed out (Victor 2001), but 
there are two reasons why Kyoto remains the framework that can support such a 
convergence. The first is political: it is diplomatically discomforting to write off a 
treaty ratified by all countries but one (since the ratification by Australia in 2007), as is 
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now the geopolitical game. The second is the for lack of anything better argument, 
that no proposed substitute provides the same potential to untie the development-
environment knot. 
An internationally coordinated carbon tax (Cooper 1998; Nordhaus 1994) 
would confront the same equity issue as a cap and trade system (higher marginal 
welfare loss for a given carbon price in low-income populations) while not providing 
ways to compensate abatements through generous allocations of quotas (Chichilnisky 
and Heal 2000). In developing countries the middle class represents a small share of 
population compared with low-income classes, and this makes it difficult to operate 
emission compensation domestically through a reshaping of fiscal systems. Net 
foreign inflows may be helpful, however, and whether they come from overseas aid at 
a similar order of magnitude as the transfers from carbon trading is, to say the least, 
open to discussion. 
An acceleration of R&D efforts disconnected from any economic signal may 
be a technological push, a model that works only for large scientific ventures (space 
exploration, conventional electronuclear fusion, etc.); a technological push is less 
effective when the innovation is to be deployed in hundreds of end-use services and 
under large controversies about the most promising technologies on the supply side. 
The six-country initiative, called the Asia–Pacific Partnership for Clean Development 
and Climate, proposes cooperative voluntary actions for the development, 
deployment, and transfer of technologies to meet these countries’ own development 
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objectives. The question remains nevertheless whether such cooperation can deliver 
its full potential in the absence of any economic signal. 
In the absence of anything better, the question might be what reinterpretation 
and amendment of the Kyoto Protocol would alleviate the current flaws? There is no 
good answer other than to put the cap and trade system into a new paradigm of 
climate negotiations. 
 
5.3.1 Shifting the Bargaining Paradigm, Shifting the Status of the Climate 
Regime 
In the reordering of the world since Kyoto, there have been far-reaching structural 
transitions in major developing countries that are sure to alter the dynamics of new 
rounds of any international negotiation. These countries’ enrichments, of course, 
create ground for demanding from them acceptance of emissions limitations; their 
response will depend on whether they will consider that investing in backbone 
infrastructures will lock them into an unsound development pattern, and whether they 
will grasp the dire implications of climate change issues for energy security (Heller and 
Shukla 2003). The initial national communications to the UNFCCC of a number of 
developing countries suggest such an alignment of climate and development 
objectives, and their governments have made multiple declarations in that direction: 
Millennium Declaration at the UN Millennium Summit (2000), the Johannesburg 
Declaration at the World Summit on Sustainable Development (2002), and the Delhi 
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Declaration on Sustainable Development and Climate Change at the Eighth 
Conference of Parties (2003). 
The outcome will depend on an acceptance of so-called offers made by the 
North, but realistically, the timing is inconvenient; it should be recognized that climate 
action is more urgent today than in 1992 and 1997. Any significant transfers to 
developing countries in climate action have to be accepted as threatening jobs. This is 
why developed countries should be serious about why  they want climate policies: Is it 
solely for environmental reasons? Or is it because of the political instability that 
climate change could create in areas of low adaptativity? Or is it part of the geopolitics 
of energy?  
A recent declaration by the G8 suggests a broadening of the negotiation 
paradigm :“We will act with resolve and urgency now to meet our shared and multiple 
objectives of reducing greenhouse gas emissions, improving the global environment, 
enhancing energy security and cutting air pollution in conjunction with our vigorous 
efforts to reduce poverty” (G8 declaration, July 2005). Climate policies could be a 
unifying force in a transformation of economic globalization into a mutually 
benefiting process instead of a devisive one for all nations and thus avert threats on 
energy security, climate refugees, and local political instability. A big step forward 
would be to replace negative arguments by positive ones. The demand for 
infrastructures in developing countries offers a window of opportunity (G8 2005) and 
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a type of Marshall Plan as implemented in the 1970s (Carter et al. 1976; Tinbergen 
1976; Brandt 1980) could enable the developing world to rise to its full potential. 
This new bargaining paradigm has two implications for the role of a climate 
regime. First, this regime does not pretend to dictate many of the core decisions 
contributing to the decarbonization of the economy. Instead it views all related policy 
processes as opportunities to internalize long term signals of the social value of 
carbon abatements. Second, its architecture is “minimal”; instead of dictating uniform 
solutions it is - i) flexible enough to crystallize bottom-up initiatives of regional or 
sector-based cooperation, and ii) integrated enough to prevent the traps of a favela 
approach. 
 
5.3.2 Basic Principles for a Minimal Architecture in a Dynamic World 
The Kyoto Protocol provides some insight into how a minimal architecture could 
secure a flexible relationship between the environmental interests and development. It 
is also necessary to dispel the notion that any flexible mechanism represents a threat 
to the environmental integrity of any climate regime. 
 
Using Carbon Prices as Inducement, not as a Unique Driver of Climate 
Policies  Decarbonization will depend on a wider range of signals than just the 
carbon price: interest rates, insurance premiums, certification of clean technologies, 
tax systems, regulation of the labor market, prices of land and housing, transport costs 
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and regulations, and local environmental factors. This is not to minimize the role of 
carbon prices but to expand the argument, since price is a parameter against which 
there can be measured climate benefits from an initiative to change behavior.   
In this view, carbon revenues do not ensure that additional carbon abatement 
accrue only from purely climate centric measures as would be the case if the world 
market could confront factories that specialize in a product with precisely measured 
GHG emissions,. Indeed, because the Kyoto Protocol only creates a carbon market 
among countries,4 it is up to governments to do the selecting, controlling, and 
redistributing of emission allowances among sectors, and to apply other policy tools 
that cannot be exchanged individually on a world carbon market.:5: Two examples are 
the lowered emissions that can result as a by-product of speed limits on vehicles 
intended for road safety or by the upgrading of regional cooperation in the South Asia 
in order to save on capital cannot be exchanged individually on a carbon market; they 
will nevertheless increase carbon selling potential on the world carbon market.. 
 The concept of a world carbon market therefore provides countries with a lot 
of flexibility to overcome any unique obstacle that the carbon price may pose for 
them individually. Governments are not forced to increase all their domestic energy 
prices by the level of the international carbon price; they have the leverage to employ 
other policy parameters in delivering their domestic objectives or constraints. 
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Terms of the Negotiation: Diversified Pledges Aligned on Long-term Price 
Signals  A precondition for making cap and trade acceptable to developing 
countries is to abandon the Malthusianism notion that commitment binds a country 
to certain emission constraints. This can be done first through diversifying the menu 
of pledges. Some considerations for global commitments for annex B (and countries 
reaching an agreed threshold level of a per capita income) might be to not preclude: 
• nonbinding global quotas (Philibert and Pershing 2002): countries could 
export carbon if they meet their targets and not be penalized in case of  an 
overshoot; 
• sector-based targets: countries could select sectors whose participation 
could bring development benefits; 
• clean development mechanisms: countries and sectors not yet mature to 
pledge emission limits could receive further supportive action through 
participation assistance programs. 
 
The argument for easing the commitment objectives might further be 
supported by the fact that developing countries are generally not in a position to 
pledge to or negotiate even the lax quotas that annex-B countries may concede to in 
order to induce them to comply  to limiting carbon emissions. With the option of 
nonbinding commitments non–annex-B countries might be brought to a good faith 
dialogue; freed from the fear of economic burden, they may also be interested in 
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regulating the system, so that the carbon value and the economic gains they have 
secured by entering the regime do not get deflated.  
Another way around the cap on development may be to base targets on 
performance criteria rather than on absolute caps for non–annex-B countries. The 
advantage here is that this limits the risk of volatility in economic growth rates,6  so 
whether fast-growing countries experience an 8 percent growth rate or only 6 
percent makes a significant 9.8 percent difference over a five-year period.7 
 
Linking Incentives to Comply with Assistance to Developing Countries The 
efficacy of a climate regime should not depend on the credibility of a government’s 
commitment, particularly since many countries (and not just the United States) will 
not accept a system limiting the sovereignty of their legislative institutions. The 
European experience of sovereignty transfers is a very specific case, and international 
affairs will likely remain a matter of pledges and review. The question is how to 
secure compliance in this regard. 
For countries with binding commitments the difficulty is that given 
uncertainty about compliance costs, good faith governments will commit themselves 
only to lax targets. To facilitate an accord on ambitious targets, a price cap was 
proposed in 1997 (Kopp, Morgenstern, and Pizer 2000); operating as a safety valve 
(the worst-polluting countries would pay an agreed-on price), it would hedge against 
bad surprises.  Although the optimists (i.e., the proponents of ambitious climate 
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action) may not be happy with an arrangement where abatement costs are low, a 
safety valve is secured. A price cap can result in a hybrid system à la Roberts and 
Spence (1976)  where a floor price provides disclosure about the price– quantity 
relationship and thus guides long-term expectations and facilitates a tightening of the 
system.  
The critics against this idea point out that the parties may not be sanctioned 
for not fulfilling their “legally binding” objectives. This is symptomatic of a 
misperception of the notion of “legally binding.” Military actions set aside, the only 
effective sanction in international affairs can ultimately come from economic and 
political reprisals, but these reprisals depend on other tools of international 
coordination than climate conventions and will never be activated regardless of any 
related issues. Without linkages the compliance provisions cannot proceed, as in the 
Marrakech Accord, beyond allowing de facto an accumulation of environmental 
debts. 
A price cap could add economic “teeth” to the system because missed 
abatements get paid, and the collected funds are used to restore the environment. 
Funds earmarked for the environment could provide an incentive for developing 
countries to participate, as is the case of the Compliance Fund proposed by Brazil 
(UNFCCC 1997) whereby in the non–annex-B countries the selecting of abatement 
projects would be through auctions. 
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Special Treatment of Energy-Intensive Industries Exposed to Global 
Competition  When passing from a general declaration to its implementation as 
policy, policy makers may face an implicit type of protest from companies in energy 
and carbon-intensive industries in the form of an argument about asymmetrical 
constraints in international competition. The risks are often overstated as regards the 
products markets: the likely impact of carbon prices on production costs are one 
order of magnitude lower than the large oscillations in exchange rates experienced 
over the last three decades (Quirion and Hourcade 2004) and the increase in 
transportation cost operates as a countervailing factor. The risk is far higher in terms 
of equity in allocations of quotas; though in a closed economy, this can be eliminated 
by allocating a minor share of quotas for free (Goulder 2004); in an open economy, 
the risks can be covered by the harmonization of quota allocation rules, especially 
the share between free allocated and auctioned quotas. 
Although it could be argued that there are many other sources of differences 
in competitive conditions (including wages), the political economics of negotiation 
amply show that no government is in a position to resist the pressure to protect jobs.  
The way out is to take stock of the fact that ultimately governments will operate 
internally a differentiation of targets and carbon prices to households and industry 
(as they do for energy prices) and can, in this way accept price equalization as an 
inescapable condition for exposed energy-intensive industry. The potential for 
conflicts at the WTO is large in this domain, and this is why it may be important to 
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rely on international sector-based agreements in the few concerned industries on the 
quota allocation rules. Since national policies would be charged with endorsing these 
agreements, most of the concerns about international competition could be 
addressed. 
 
5.3.3 Reconciling Long-term Goals and Immediate Pressures from Shifting 
Context of ODA 
Because the benefits that accrue from decarbonization (carbon revenues, avoided 
damages) are long term, the political agents may feel blocked by the absence of 
tangible short-term gains. For countries under urgent pressure to switch to more 
carbon-intensive technologies (introducing motorized transport for bicycling or 
animal traction, deforestation to increase food production) short-term action could 
help prevent future carbon-intensive lock-ins.  
 Inevitably there will be need for annex-B countries to fashion overseas aid and 
multilateral financing as climate policy tools to accompany such reforms in non–annex-
B countries. The debate framed so far is in terms of avoiding a crowding-out of public 
aid by transfers submitted with environmental conditionalities. This prospect could be 
avoided by the provision of additional resources to the carbon-trading regime (price 
caps, shares of proceeds from carbon trading, taxes on bunkers and international 
aviation). Indeed how to raise money is far less difficult than to guarantee their efficient 
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use in conjunction with other funding mechanisms. This has become all the more 
complex as developing countries are evolving quickly in very different directions. 
Rapidly emerging countries are now main recipients of international private 
investments. But the  quantity and quality responses to the flow of funds are not 
meeting the corresponding investment requirements on decarbonization objectives. 
Public funds could be used to provide support for critical project financing and, more 
important, for public–private technical and institutional partnerships (structural 
reforms, multilateral agencies, credit exportation agencies, third-party financing). 
Developing countries whose reduction potentials are only limited volumes of 
emissions would in this way  receive assistance from ODA for the construction of 
infrastructures and for enlarging basic structural needs. 
Climate policies offer the opportunity of adding a quantifiable dimension (the 
emissions levels) for evaluating ODA efficiency, for disciplining the investor and the 
host country, and for ensuring quality results for money expended. The monitoring 
capacity can also be used indirectly by development finance institutions to provide 
risk mitigation instruments. The PLANTAR project (sustainable fuelwood under the 
PCF) in Minas Gerais (Brazil) could not obtain any currency risk insurance beyond 
two years; with carbon finance revenues (US$ or € denominated) placed in an 
offshore escrow account, an OECD commercial bank agreed to a five-year loan and 
the amortization is structured to match expected payments for the CERs. Emission 
reduction purchase agreements (ERPA) can serve as a type of insurance package that 
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can be dedicated to funding project completions. ERPA funds can generate the 
necessary cash and prevent currency risk, because the lenders must provide the cash 
up front. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
Climate policies cannot be an isolated item on the international agenda. Objectives of 
environmental integrity present opportunities for engaging developing countries in 
pro-active climate strategies. The problem with envisaging the cap and trade system as 
an architecture encompassing all gases, sectors, economic actors, and governments is 
that the focus remains on securing a traded ton of carbon that  is precisely measured, 
whereas the core challenge is to curtail future emissions from quickly expanding 
infrastructures where the counterfactual baselines are impractical to measure. The cap 
and trade system misses opportunities for accruing mutual benefits of climate and 
development actions that relate primarily to these new infrastructures. The system will 
merely polarizes the debate on sharing the burden of carbon abatement rather than on 
mainstreaming the climate actions with development agenda. There should be 
concern about the constraint on development that a cap and trade system would 
bring. 
There are mechanisms through which climate policies can exert a leverage 
effect on development that are absent in the cap and trade scheme. A mix of price 
signals, capital inflows, and technology transfers could be generated by carbon trading 
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systems, but most important is institutional design by which revenues from carbon 
trading can be directed to removing obstacles to development and integrated into 
development policies. The configurations for such integration might vary, but in any 
case require a bottom-up design for facilitating a coordination of diverse initiatives 
and cost-effective and welfare-maximizing actions for mutual benefits vis-à-vis the 
development and carbon abatement objectives. 
The nature of problem makes it neither politically feasible nor economically 
prudent to start from a full-fledged “grand architecture” nor to rely only on self-
organizing processes such as the Madisonian approach (Victor et al. 2005) that set 
ambitious but nonbinding goals and do not generate the credible and stable policy 
signals such as could secure carbon saving investment in developing infrastructures. 
The way out is not to dismiss the Kyoto Protocol, though it was ratified by 
overwhelming majority countries, but to re-interpret it by inverting the climate centric 
view that has prevailed so far. The technical instruments of inversion would involve 
the diversification of pledges, nonbinding commitments, safety valves, voluntary 
agreements in some key sectors of the world industry, re-design of the CDM in the 
direction of infrastructures programs. All these tools can be aligned to assemble a set 
of initiatives that will not result in a fragmentation of effort. But the challenge will be 
the many linkages of energy security, local environment issues, debt traps or social 
dualism, and reshaping of international funding and overseas aid that need to be 
recognized. The climate regime should be part and parcel of Pareto-improving policies 
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that seek beneficial exchange in the globalization of economies and to narrow the 
North–South divide (Stiglitz 1998). 
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1. The vital lead of Myrdal’s ‘Asian Drama’, Sen’s early contributions, R. Dumont’s 
‘Afrique Noire est mal partie’, the UNCTAD group (R. Prebisch) was to raise 
questions both about the trickling down of the Western economic growth to 
developing countries (Rostow) and about the replication in these countries of the 
socialist primitive capital accumulation. 
2. For a detailed description of the methodology refer to Mathy et al. (2001). 
3. This region comprising of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka holds nearly a quarter of world population 
4. to minimize market powers and the strategic use of carbon trading by governments, 
one important addition to the Marrakech accord would be to impose that all imports 
and exports between governments take place through transparent auctioning on a 
state regulated clearinghouse. 
5. To this respect the European Carbon Trading System is not a small scale model of 
an international trading system; it is one specific modality adopted by some 
governments to meet their targets 
6.  a floor price of carbon can provide an additional hedge against deflated carbon 
prices.  
7. Chinese per capita growth rate was 2% in 1990 and 13% in 1992; Argentina 
experienced a -8% in 1989 and a 9% in 1991.  
